What fills the gap.
What happens when it reopens.
6 critical flows analyzed through the full disruption cycle: the gap, who fills it, how fast, contract structure, what happens on return, and historical precedent. Each flow has a structural gap that cannot be fully filled — understanding the residual is where the edge lives.
01 Crude Oil (Iranian + Gulf) Q1 2026 Hormuz flow measured 14.6M b/d (-29.7% YoY, EIA); at peak closure daily transit collapsed >95%. Net unfillable gap is ~8-10M b/d after bypass pipelines (Petroline 7.0M b/d capacity but Yanbu-capped ~4.0-4.5M b/d; UAE Fujairah 1.8M b/d; Iraq/Kuwait/Qatar have none). The structural 2026 difference vs 1990: Saudi/UAE spare capacity is itself Hormuz-trapped, so there is no clean swing-producer offset. medium
hormuz_closure (Q1 2026 measured): 14.6M b/d transit (crude 10.7 + liquids 3.9), down from 20.7M b/d Q4 2025 (EIA, T1, HIGH); peak daily >95% collapse Mar-Apr 2026 (SeaVantage, T2, MEDIUM). oil_strike: ~3.0M b/d unplanned refinery/field offline by Mar 23 2026 (Wood Mackenzie, T2, MEDIUM). Iranian crude to China: ~1.38M b/d halted/sanctioned; teapot refiner Hengli sanctioned Apr 24 2026 (Kpler/CNBC; NYT, T2, HIGH). Bypass ceiling ~5.5-6.5M b/d = ~30% of normal 20M b/d. The '3x the 1973 embargo' framing is Rapidan via CNBC (T2, MEDIUM), no official corroboration.
Russia ESPO seaborne to China +0.3-0.6M b/d (~$5-8/bbl discount, 30-60d, MEDIUM); Russian Urals to India/China +0.5-1.0M b/d (~$10-15 discount, immediate, US general license Mar 2026, MEDIUM); West African rerouted to Asia +0.3-0.5M b/d (~$2-4 premium, LOW); Brazilian pre-salt +0.2-0.4M b/d (~$3-5 premium, LOW); US shale +0.2-0.5M b/d over 3-6 mo (light sweet only, cannot replace heavy sour, MEDIUM); IEA SPR 400M bbl authorized (~1.4M b/d sustained over 120 days, HIGH); China SPR ~1.2B bbl / ~109 days cover (MEDIUM). OPEC+ deliverable spare ~2.0M b/d vs 5.2M claimed (Kingdom Exploration, T3, LOW) but the structural point that Saudi/UAE spare is Hormuz-trapped is T2-confirmed.
Days 1-7: SPR draw ~1.4M b/d; OPEC+ +206k b/d (Mar 1); Saudi pre-loads. Days 7-30: Petroline+Fujairah maxed + reroutes, +3.0-4.5M b/d. Months 2-3: Russian ESPO/Urals + Brazil/West Africa redirect, +1.5-2.5M b/d. Months 3-6: US shale +0.2-0.5M b/d, demand destruction -2-3M b/d begins. Cumulative fillable within 90 days ~6-8M b/d against ~10-14M b/d gross removal at peak = structural gap (MODEL/EST, MEDIUM).
Gulf crude on Saudi OSP/ADNOC official-selling-price system, ~1-year nominations; force majeure declared across Gulf loading programs from Feb 28 2026. Spot vs term ~25-30% / ~70-75% pre-conflict (MODEL/EST, LOW). Iranian crude is all grey-market/shadow-fleet, yuan-denominated, no standard SPA (T2, HIGH).
Goldman models Brent $85-92 on containment/quick reopening vs $100+ for extended closure (T2, MEDIUM); the $20-30/bbl reversal estimate is MODEL/EST, LOW. Iran reclaiming ~0.8-1.0M b/d vs 1.38 pre-conflict over 12-24 months is MODEL/EST, LOW. West African/Brazil term deals signed during the disruption (12-24 mo) create structural displacement (T2, MEDIUM).
1990 Gulf War: Iraq+Kuwait loss ~4.3-5.2M b/d (Oxford Energy, T1, HIGH); Saudi ramped 5.3M b/d (Jul 1990) to 8.35M b/d (Dec 1990), +3M b/d in ~5 months via 146 wells + 12 GOSPs (Saudi Aramco 1990 report/OSTI, T1, HIGH); shortfall compensated by Oct 1990 (~2 months); price $17/bbl (Jul) to ~$46 peak (Oct). 2022 Russia-Ukraine: US shale added only +0.7-0.9M b/d over 6-9 months, light sweet only. The decisive 2026 contrast: in 1990 Saudi had free Red Sea export access; in 2026 the swing capacity is Hormuz-trapped.
Disruption: long crude futures, long Cape-route VLCC equity, long non-Gulf producers (Petrobras, Nigerian NOC) and US E&P; risk = SPR-release timing and ceasefire reversal. Sustained gap (3-12 mo): long USGC refinery margins and oilfield services; risk = demand-destruction recession at $100+ oil. Return/ceasefire: short crude (SPR refill + reopening oversupply), short tanker rates; risk = Iran recovery slower than priced and entrenched new trade routes.
02 LNG (Qatar) Zero laden LNG vessels crossed Hormuz between Mar 1 and Apr 24 2026, removing >10 Bcf/d (~20% of global LNG) — chiefly Qatar's Ras Laffan. Unlike crude, LNG has no pipeline bypass: Qatar export is binary (zero or full) under closure. US terminals at 94% utilization can add only ~0.6 Bcf/d short-term; US+Australia combined ceiling is ~4 Bcf/d against the ~10 Bcf/d gap. JKM +51% / TTF +35% by late April; Henry Hub -9% (US insulated). high
hormuz_closure: >10 Bcf/d; 0 laden LNG crossings confirmed Mar 1-Apr 24 2026 (EIA, T1, HIGH). QatarEnergy force majeure Mar 4 2026; Ras Laffan struck by drones Mar 3 (GRC, T2, MEDIUM). Qatar capacity at risk ~77 Mt/yr (~10 Bcf/d), ~93% Hormuz-dependent (HIGH). Physical constraint: LNG carriers cannot reroute around Hormuz (no pipeline), so Qatar export is binary (STRUCTURAL, HIGH). Price response (EIA, HIGH): TTF $14.80/MMBtu (wk ending Apr 24, +35%); JKM $16.02/MMBtu (+51%); Henry Hub -9% since Feb 27; EU storage entered summer 2026 at 28% full vs 41% 5-yr avg.
US LNG (21.5% share): 17.9 Bcf/d (Mar 2026, 94% utilization); +0.5 Bcf/d Plaquemines + 0.1 Elba (approved Mar/Apr 2026) + ~2.4 Bcf/d DOE-authorized capacity progressively Apr-Dec 2026 (EIA, T1, HIGH). Australia (19.7%): ~+0.5-1.0 Bcf/d spot reallocation, 30-60d (MODEL/EST, LOW). US+Australia ceiling <=4 Bcf/d (GRC, T2, MEDIUM). Trinidad/Norway/Algeria +0.5-1.0 Bcf/d spot (LOW). Mozambique Coral FLNG ~0.34 Bcf/d, negligible increment (LOW).
Immediate (days): portfolio players (Shell, BP, TotalEnergies) redirect flexible US cargoes, +1-2 Bcf/d (LOW). Month 1-2: US terminals 94%+ + DOE approvals, +0.6 Bcf/d new (T1, HIGH). Month 2-6: ~2.4 Bcf/d DOE-authorized capacity online progressively, +1.5-2.0 Bcf/d (T1, HIGH). Year 1-3: new US FIDs, ~75% US capacity expansion by 2030; demand destruction ~-15% European industrial gas at $14+/MMBtu (LOW).
Qatar term SPAs ~70-75% (15-25yr, oil-indexed, destination clauses), ~25-30% spot/short-term (split is MODEL/EST, LOW; GIIGNL does not publish Qatar-specific). >80% of Qatari buyers are Asian (EIA, T1, HIGH). QatarEnergy invoked FM Mar 4 2026 — all delivery obligations suspended. US-to-Asia arbitrage ~$6-8/MMBtu spread (JKM $16 vs ~$9-10 TTF-equiv) (MODEL/EST, LOW).
Goldman baseline TTF 44/40 EUR/MWh Q3/Q4 without extended closure vs 65/53 with; reversion within 2-4 weeks of a credible reopening signal (T2/MODEL, LOW). Ras Laffan cold-start restart 2-4 weeks minimum, 4-8 weeks with infrastructure damage (MODEL/EST, MEDIUM). Structural shift: 2022 precedent saw ~65 Mt/yr US term contracts signed (DQE #5, MEDIUM/directional). LNG oversupply risk on return: Qatar full volume + US 2027-28 wave potentially 15-25 Mt/yr surplus (MODEL/EST, LOW).
2022 European energy crisis: Russian pipeline gas removed over 18 months; TTF peaked ~EUR340/MWh (Aug 2022); US LNG to Europe surged >100% 2021-2024; ~65 Mt/yr new US term contracts 2022-2024 (EnkiAI, T2, MEDIUM/uncertain magnitude). 2026 analog: Qatar disruption is binary and faster, and the European storage deficit entering summer 2026 (28% vs 41%) is materially worse.
Disruption: long Henry Hub/TTF spread, long US LNG equity (Cheniere, New Fortress). Sustained gap: accelerated US LNG FIDs, long portfolio players (Shell, TotalEnergies). Return: short TTF on rapid normalization; assess Qatar contract renegotiation outcomes (QatarEnergy exposure via ExxonMobil/TotalEnergies stakes).
03 Fertilizer / Ammonia NDSU models Gulf urea exports at 20.6 Mt/yr (~40% of global) with 3-4 Mt/month not reaching markets during closure. The unique severity vs 2022: Gulf disrupts ~30-40% of global urea trade while Russia (~14-23%) and China are both simultaneously constrained, so there is no swing supplier. NDSU scenario floors: urea $532/st (+13%) under Quick Reopening to $790+/st (+68%) under Extended Conflict through March 2028. Food-price impact lags fertilizer by 6-9 months. high
Source conflict on Gulf share: CNBC/IFPRI ~30% of urea trade at risk, NDSU ~40% Gulf share, Fortune/Platts ~33% — NDSU taken as primary (most recent, methodology-documented); range 30-40% used. NDSU Apr 2026 (T1/MODEL, HIGH): urea 20.6 Mt/yr (~40%), ammonia 4.1 Mt/yr (~26%), DAP 3.6 Mt/yr (~23%), sulfur 15.3 Mt/yr (~44%). Disrupted ~3-4 Mt/month not reaching markets (also CNBC, T2). QAFCO Qatar (world's largest single-site urea, 5.6 Mt/yr) fully suspended under FM (HIGH). NOTE: differs from the IFPRI 36% urea / 29% ammonia anchor used in Sections 1-2 — see anchorReconciliation.
Russia (~23% ammonia / ~14% urea): export suspension to Apr 21 2026, sanctions/SWIFT barriers (MEDIUM). China (~3.5 Mt/month urea): export restrictions through Aug 2026 (MEDIUM); NDSU notes Russia + China constrained simultaneously. Egypt: ~5-6 Mt/yr, emerging swing supplier, FOB ~$800/MT by Mar 2026, but LNG-linked gas costs rising (CNBC, T2, MEDIUM). Trinidad +0.3-0.5 Mt/yr (LOW, logistically remote from Asia). US Gulf Coast marginal increment at $700+ NOLA (LOW). Indonesia/Malaysia +2-3 Mt/yr combined, domestic-oriented (LOW).
Weeks 1-4: spot hoarding + Egypt surge + partial Russia/China, +0.3-0.5 Mt/month, prices +40-50% immediately (corroborated by actuals). Months 2-3: Russia resumes after Apr 21 + Egypt peak, +0.5-1.0 Mt/month, plateau $700-800/MT. Months 3-6: China lifts Aug ban + North African cargoes, +1.5-2.0 Mt/month, easing begins. Months 6-12: new US USGC ammonia + Russia normalizes, structural floor $532/st (NDSU, HIGH).
Urea predominantly spot, 15-30% seasonal forward (fall prepay/spring fill) (MODEL/EST, LOW). QAFCO/SABIC ammonia tolling typically 1-5yr take-or-pay; FM invoked. Buyers locking 12-month forwards with Egypt/Trinidad/US USGC (T2, MEDIUM).
NDSU three-scenario urea FOB NOLA paths (T1/MODEL, HIGH): Quick Reopening peak $782/st (Jul 2026), Mar-2028 floor $532/st (+13%); Contested Transit peak $784/st, floor $610+/st (+30%); Extended Conflict peak $996/st (Oct 2026), floor $790+/st (+68%). Demand destruction: Contested 7.0 Mt cumulative (14% annualized), Extended 10.1 Mt (20%); Brazil pullback -1.94 Mt under Extended. Urea-to-corn affordability: Contested 174 bu/st, Extended 221 bu/st vs 2022 peak 110 and long-run avg 79. Food security: 6-9 month lag to food-price impact; FAO/IFPRI 37M+ additional at risk (CNBC citing, MEDIUM, primary not fetched).
2022 Russia-Ukraine: Russia ~23% ammonia / 14% urea; Togliatti-Odesa pipeline suspended Mar 2022; urea peaked ~$910/st FOB NOLA Apr 2022 (NDSU, HIGH); recovery to $350-450 by late 2023 via demand destruction + Russia/China resume. 2026 contrast: Gulf disrupts ~30-40% of global trade (vs Russia 14-23%) and the Russia/China swing suppliers are both simultaneously constrained — higher structural severity per NDSU.
Disruption: long ex-Gulf nitrogen producers (CF Industries, Nutrien, Yara, OCI); urea futures (CME). Sustained gap: long ag-commodity futures (corn, wheat) on elevated input-cost floor; DAP futures. Return: short urea futures if Gulf + Russia + China normalize together; agri-equipment equity (Deere, AGCO).
04 Shipping Capacity As of Mar 2 2026, 138 container ships / ~470,000 TEUs were trapped in the Gulf (10.7% of the global container fleet by TEU). Cape-of-Good-Hope rerouting adds 10-14 days and ~3,500-4,000 nm, eliminating 2-3 annual rotations per ship and cutting effective Asia-Europe capacity ~15-18% (Maersk). No new fleet is available this cycle (2-3yr shipbuilding lead time); the relief valve is blanked sailings, rate spikes, and demand softening. medium
138 container ships / 470,000 TEUs trapped in Gulf, Mar 2 2026 (Alphaliner via SeaVantage, T2, HIGH) = 10.7% of global container fleet by TEU (MEDIUM). Effective Asia-Europe capacity loss 15-18% (Maersk, T2, MEDIUM). Cape adds ~3,500-4,000 nm (Singapore-Rotterdam 20,500 nm Cape vs 12,500 Suez, HIGH) and 10-14 days/voyage (HIGH). 25% of Asia-Middle East sailings withdrawn (ICIS, Apr 1 2026, MEDIUM). Tonne-mile: Singapore-Rotterdam Cape +64%/voyage; if 25-30% of Asia-Europe trade uses Cape, lane tonne-mile demand +16-19% at same cargo volume (STRUCTURAL arithmetic, HIGH). $8B/month aggregate cost (Middle East Insider, T2, MEDIUM, no official corroboration).
Container: Cape reroute + alternate-hub congestion (Salalah, Colombo, Mundra, Khor Fakkan); partial relief only via blanked sailings. VLCC (crude): Cape adds ~8-10 days Gulf-Asia, utilization at multi-year high, no new tankers (2-3yr lead). LNG carriers: Qatar zero loadings, ~80 Mt/yr fleet idle, diverting to US/Australia loading (fleet available, feedstock-constrained). Dry bulk: fertilizer/grain rerouting +5-8 days, Baltic Dry elevated, moderate absorption.
Day 1-7: top-4 carriers suspend Hormuz + emergency surcharges; Asia-Europe +20%, Gulf lanes +30-55% (SeaVantage, MEDIUM). Week 2-4: Cape tightened + blanked sailings; Asia-Europe +40-55% spot (ICIS, MEDIUM). Month 2-3: secondary congestion, Singapore VLSFO +35%; transpacific +40%; Drewry/Xeneta model $6,500-8,000/FEU if >60 days (MEDIUM). Post-ceasefire: trapped vessels exit 2-4 weeks, routing normalizes (LOW).
Carriers pivoted to weekly rate releases only during disruption — effectively spot (historically ~60% annual / ~40% spot). Surcharge stack (Mar 2 2026): War Risk $1,500/TEU (Hapag-Lloyd) + Emergency Conflict $3,000/FEU (CMA CGM/Hapag-Lloyd) + bunker + GRIs + Emergency Recovery (SeaVantage, T2, HIGH). P&I war-risk insurance withdrawn Mar 5 2026 for Gulf waters — transit commercially uninsurable for standard operators.
Red Sea 2024 precedent: Drewry WCI +141% by Nov 2024; normalized over 6-9 months after routing stabilized (World Bank, T1, HIGH). MSI: initial spike then market weakening H2 2026 if demand softens (T2, MEDIUM). New shipbuilding 2-3yr lead — no fleet increment this cycle (STRUCTURAL, HIGH).
Red Sea Houthi crisis (Dec 2023-present): Drewry WCI +141%, Shanghai-Rotterdam +230% at peak (World Bank, T1, HIGH); Asia-N.Europe ~$1,500/FEU (Dec 2023) to ~$5,000/FEU (Jan 2024) in ~6 weeks. 2026 compound: carriers already on extended Cape routing now face an additional Gulf closure — a dual-chokepoint closure unprecedented in modern container shipping.
Disruption: long tanker equity (Cape-route VLCC) and liner equity (Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd) on rate spikes. Sustained: long African port infrastructure and Cape-hub bunker suppliers. Return: short liner equity on rate reversal + demand weakening; port-operator equity.
05 Internet Bandwidth (Submarine Cables) Total global LEO satellite capacity (~50 Tbps downlink, ~5 Tbps symmetric) versus ~8,750 Tbps of submarine-cable capacity is a ~175:1 deficit — satellites cannot replace bulk cable traffic. Crucially, the primary Gulf-conflict risk is Gulf-DOMESTIC connectivity, not the Asia-Europe backbone (which runs through Red Sea cables ~900 miles from Hormuz). Only one repair vessel (e-Marine) is currently inside the Gulf, and repair ships will not enter an active war zone — so the binding constraint is post-ceasefire UXO clearance. medium
Gulf cables at risk: AAE-1, FALCON, Gulf Bridge International (TeleGeography, T1, HIGH). Repair vessels inside Gulf: 1 (e-Marine, UAE) (HIGH). Sept 2025 Red Sea damage: 4 cables, 3 repaired in 5 months, 1 still out (HIGH). 2Africa Pearls FM declared by Alcatel Submarine Networks Mar 13 2026, Ile de Batz stranded at Dammam (LA Times/RCR Wireless, T2, HIGH). Global submarine capacity ~8,750 Tbps (2026 est, T3, MEDIUM); total LEO satellite ~50 Tbps downlink / ~5 Tbps usable symmetric (T3, MEDIUM). Specific Gulf-cable bandwidth: no public figure (proxy: modern cable 200-400 Tbps, Gulf legacy likely 10-50 Tbps, LOW). Asia-Europe backbone routes via Red Sea (~900 mi from Hormuz), so Gulf cable damage is primarily domestic, not global-backbone (T1, HIGH).
Starlink ~1-2 Tbps usable (5-10% efficiency on ~50 Tbps downlink; uplink-constrained, no data-center-grade throughput, 20-50ms latency) (MODEL/EST, MEDIUM). OneWeb/Eutelsat <0.5 Tbps (LOW). Amazon Kuiper <50 sats operational May 2026, years from meaningful deployment (LOW). Terrestrial via Oman/Saudi: limited cross-connects, Gulf-domestic only, cannot carry Europe-Asia volume (TeleGeography, T1, HIGH).
Immediate: terrestrial Oman/Saudi cross-connect + Starlink enterprise, 5-15% Gulf domestic (MEDIUM). Days 1-30: emergency satellite agreements + CDN edge caching, 10-20% consumer-grade, financial infra constrained (MEDIUM). Month 1-to-ceasefire: no cable repair possible in active conflict, repair ships will not enter war zone, no improvement (T1, HIGH). Post-ceasefire: UXO/seafloor survey required first; full repair 5-12+ months (LOW). Year 2+: 2Africa Pearls reconnection + Project Waterworth (bypasses Middle East) — multi-year (LOW).
Submarine cable Indefeasible Rights of Use (IRU), 15-25yr; FM on physical severance. Gulf carriers (du, e&/Etisalat, Ooredoo, STC) mix Gulf cables + Red Sea coast landings + terrestrial; Saudi Arabia routes majority bandwidth via Red Sea coast, giving partial resilience (TeleGeography, T1, HIGH).
UXO clearance is the binding post-ceasefire constraint. Precedent: Persian Gulf mine-clearing 1987-88 (Operation Earnest Will) took ~12 months; estimate 6+ months minimum for survey+clearance (MODEL/EST, LOW). Halted projects (SMW6, FIG, WorldLink) face 12-24+ month delays beyond conflict end (T2, MEDIUM). Google Project Waterworth (US-India-South Africa-Brazil, bypasses Middle East) accelerated by the disruption but years from completion (T2, MEDIUM).
Feb 2024 Red Sea cuts: AAE-1, Seacom/TGN-EA, EIG — ~25% Asia-Europe traffic degraded; AAE-1 ~5 months to repair; satellite did not replace enterprise/financial/CDN traffic at scale. Sept 2025: 4 cables, 3 repaired in 5 months, 1 still out (T1, HIGH). 2026: both Gulf and Red Sea simultaneously inaccessible to repair ships — no historical precedent for dual-chokepoint cable-maintenance paralysis.
Disruption: long satellite operators (Eutelsat OneWeb) and Gulf telcos with terrestrial diversity (e&, STC). Sustained: long cable-infrastructure suppliers (Nokia/ASN, TE SubCom) and cloud edge providers. Structural: long Project Waterworth beneficiaries (Meta, Google infrastructure exposure) and non-Middle East cable routes.
06 Refined Products (Diesel & Jet) Gulf refineries supplied 60% of Europe's jet fuel and 30% of its diesel in 2025 (Wood Mackenzie, MEDIUM) — entirely blocked under closure. NW Europe jet cracks hit $100/bbl and diesel $70/bbl (4-5x pre-war) by early March 2026, and the top-3 global jet exporters (China, South Korea, Kuwait) were simultaneously impaired. Substitution requires spare REFINING capacity (not just crude): ~600-900k b/d fillable in 30-60 days against ~2.17M b/d offline = a 1.2-1.6M b/d structural middle-distillate gap. medium
Gulf seaborne fuel total (Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi, UAE) 5.51M b/d (2024 record, +7% YoY) (Kpler/OilX via Reuters, T2, HIGH). Kuwait Al Zour jet ~186k b/d, diesel-to-Europe ~107k b/d (2024) (Argus, T2, HIGH). NW Europe cracks early Mar 2026: jet $100/bbl, diesel $70/bbl, 4-5x pre-war (Wood Mackenzie, T2, MEDIUM). Asia cash premiums Mar 2 2026: jet +$4/bbl, diesel +$4.25/bbl, multi-year high (Reuters, T2, HIGH). Top-3 jet exporters (China, S.Korea, Kuwait) all simultaneously impaired (NPR, T2, MEDIUM). Gulf refinery offline ~2.17M b/d by Mar 23 2026 (LinkedIn-origin — DQE #2, MEDIUM/directional; plausible given confirmed Ras Tanura/Al Zour/Kerbala).
India (Reliance, HPCL, IOC) ~+300-500k b/d diesel/jet, already rerouting Reliance cargoes from West-of-Suez to Asia, 30-60d (Reuters, T2, HIGH). South Korea feedstock-disrupted, reduced output until alternative crude, 30-60d (LOW). US Gulf Coast ~1.0M b/d spare (light sweet WTI) +200-400k b/d at premium, 45-90d (LOW). Dangote (Nigeria) 650k b/d nameplate (~300k operational) +50-100k b/d to Africa/Europe, 60-90d (MEDIUM). European refineries +100-200k b/d on North Sea/West African crude (LOW). Structural gap ~600-900k b/d fillable in 30-60d vs ~2.17M b/d offline = 1.2-1.6M b/d gap (MODEL/EST, MEDIUM).
Day 1-14: crack spike, Europe systemic jet-shortage warnings, ~0 added, jet $100/diesel $70 NW Europe (Wood Mac, MEDIUM). Week 2-4: India reroutes, Korea/China source alternative crude, +200-300k b/d, 4-5x sustained (MEDIUM). Month 1-3: US USGC ramp + European feedstock rerouting, +400-600k b/d, normalizing from peak (~$40-60/bbl jet) (LOW). Month 3-6: India/Korea fully rerouted + Dangote, +600-900k b/d, $20-30/bbl range (LOW). Post-ceasefire: undamaged Gulf refineries restart 2-4 weeks, damaged 12-36 months, oversupply risk (LOW).
Middle-distillate term contracts 3-12 months priced vs Platts jet CIF NW Europe, now at extreme spot premium. Airline hedging typically 50-80% 6-12 months forward; pre-war $40-60 crack hedges deeply underwater vs $100 actuals (no official disclosure figures). European diesel already redirected to India/US/Middle East post the Feb 2023 Russia ban — 2026 is a second structural shock within 3 years.
Jet crack reversion likely within 4-6 weeks of confirmed Gulf refinery restart (MODEL/EST, LOW). If Ras Tanura/Al Zour severely damaged, reconstruction 12-36 months — possible but no public damage assessment as of May 30 2026. Permanent route change: Dangote + India product exports to Europe emerging as structural (T2, MEDIUM).
1990 Gulf War: Kuwait/Iraq refinery output (~750k b/d products) offline; products market recovered 12-18 months; Kuwait capacity ~3 years to restore (MERIP, T2, MEDIUM). 2022 European diesel shock: Russian diesel ban (Feb 2023) removed ~500k b/d EU supply; India became a structural European diesel supplier and Russia filled the African gap. 2026 repeats this pattern at larger scale.
Disruption: long complex refinery margins (Valero, Marathon USGC cracks) and Reliance Industries. Sustained: long product tankers (LR2, MR) on long-haul routes and Dangote (pre-IPO); ULSD futures. Return: short USGC refinery margins; assess Ras Tanura damage scope (refinery relative value).
T1 official (EIA, IEA, GIIGNL, IFPRI, TeleGeography, ICPC, NDSU): primary evidence. T2 press/proprietary (Reuters, Bloomberg, S&P Global, Kpler, Wood Mackenzie, Drewry): directionally reliable. T3 model (Goldman Sachs, Rapidan Energy): flagged as estimates. Wikipedia, LinkedIn, Facebook excluded from primary evidence. 2026 conflict data provisional. Per-flow confidence reflects weakest link in each chain.