Live · as of May 29, 2026
Hormuz closure: REALIZED (ongoing)Oil-infra strike: PARTIALLY REALIZEDCable severance: REPAIR-RISK REALIZEDCeasefire: IN EFFECT (not economic)
Brent ~$92/bblHormuz ~11 vessels/dJKM / TTF ~$18 / $16.5Urea >$850/MTFreight ~$2,800/40ft
Scenario analysis

What happens if
they follow through.

Every threat has a market cascade. We map the infrastructure at risk, quantify the impact of each scenario, and reference what happened when similar events occurred in the past. This is how you prepare — by understanding every variable before it moves.

What the market did last time

Four events that reshaped energy markets. Each one shows how quickly prices move, how long disruptions last, and what the recovery looked like.

2019
Abqaiq-Khurais Attack
5.7M bbl/day offline
Oil impact+20% overnight ($60 → $72)
Supply lost50% of Saudi production
Recovery2M bbl/day in 48h, full in 2 weeks
Price recoveryRetraced within weeks
Rapid Saudi restoration capacity limited duration. A sustained or repeated attack would be structurally different.
2023-25
Houthi Red Sea Campaign
2,700% insurance spike
Ships attacked130+ vessels, 190+ incidents
Insurance0.07% → 2.0% hull value
Container rates5x surge ($1K → $5.2K/FEU)
Suez Canal-57% traffic, still -60% after 100 days
Non-state actors can sustainably disrupt chokepoints. Insurance market impact exceeds direct physical damage.
1990
Iraq Invasion of Kuwait
Oil doubled: $21 → $46
Supply removed4.3M bbl/day (Iraq + Kuwait)
Peak price$46/bbl (Oct 1990), +119%
Duration~9 month price shock
Macro effectContributed to US recession
Total supply removal causes sustained, severe price shocks. IEA strategic reserves eventually moderated prices.
1984-88
Iran-Iraq Tanker War
411 ships attacked
Casualties430+ civilian sailors
Insurance peak7.5% hull value (Kharg)
Oil impactSurprisingly stable — flow continued
Mine threatUSS Roberts: 13-month repair
Sustained low-level shipping attacks raise insurance dramatically but don't spike oil if flow continues through the chokepoint.

What's at risk and what it means

Quantified capacity at each critical node — what each side can credibly threaten, and what the market impact would be if it's hit.

Strait of Hormuz
Maritime chokepoint
20.9M bbl/day
25% of seaborne oil20% of global LNG21nm wide at narrowest
If closed: Oil +$40-60/bbl within 48h. Bypass capacity: 8.5-9M bbl/day via Saudi Petroline (7M) + UAE ADCOP (1.5-1.8M) — covers ~43% of transit. Clearance timeline: weeks to months depending on mine deployment.
Kharg Island
Iran's primary export terminal
96% of Iran exports
~1.58M bbl/day current30-34M bbl storage25km offshore
If struck: Oil +$15-25/bbl, Iran exports to zero. China loses 1.5M bbl/day supply. Iran likely retaliates against Saudi/UAE facilities. 6-18 months to rebuild.
Submarine Internet Cables
Communications infrastructure
17-30% of global traffic
17+ cable systems in Red Sea~60 repair ships globally$30K+/day repair cost
If severed: ME/Asia latency +300-500ms. Crypto exchange connectivity gaps, DEX arbitrage premium. SWIFT routing delays, FX settlement risk. Repair: 3-8 months. Feb 2024 precedent: AAE-1 took 5 months.
Ras Tanura
Saudi Arabia's largest oil terminal
9M bbl/day design
~5.5M bbl/day actual16 VLCCs simultaneouslyOffshore berths
If hit (retaliation): Oil +$20-35/bbl. Saudi exports divert to Yanbu via Petroline. Offshore infrastructure harder to repair than onshore — weeks to months. Combined with Hormuz closure: catastrophic.
Abqaiq Processing
World's largest crude stabilization
7M bbl/day
Processes most Saudi exportsInland facilityAttacked 2019
If hit again: Proven impact: +20% oil overnight (2019). Sustained attack: months of disruption. Essentially irreplaceable — no equivalent backup facility exists anywhere.
Bypass Infrastructure
Hormuz contingency pipelines
8.5-9M bbl/day combined
Petroline: 7M bbl/day to YanbuADCOP: 1.5-1.8M to FujairahWest-East 1: 2027 (~doubles UAE bypass)
Strategic context: Combined bypass covers ~43% of Hormuz transit. Gap of ~11-12M bbl/day would need to come from strategic reserves or demand destruction. Both pipelines expanded specifically in response to the 2026 conflict.

Four paths forward

Each scenario with its realized status as of May 29 2026, market cascade, counter-response, and historical parallel. Forward probability estimates have been superseded by events: Hormuz closure is realized and ongoing, oil-infrastructure and cable disruption partially realized, and the April 8 ceasefire remains in effect militarily but has not restored trade.

Iranian oil infrastructure strike
PARTIALLY REALIZED
Oil+$15-25/bbl
Iran exports→ zero
China supply-1.5M bbl/day
Rebuild6-18 months
Counter-response: Iran retaliates against Saudi/UAE export infrastructure. GCC air defense activation. Potential Hormuz mining.
Precedent: 1986-1988 Kharg War phase — Iran's exports were repeatedly disrupted but never fully eliminated.
Submarine cable severance
REPAIR-RISK REALIZED
Internet17-30% disrupted
Latency+300-500ms ME/Asia
CryptoExchange gaps
Repair3-8 months
Counter-response: Satellite backup activation, traffic rerouting. Only ~60 cable ships exist globally. Permits required for conflict-zone waters.
Precedent: Feb 2024 Yemen cable cuts — 4 cables severed, AAE-1 repair took 5 months in conflict zone.
Negotiated ceasefire
IN EFFECT (not economic)
Oil-$10-15/bbl
GCC equities+8-12% rally
War-risk-80% collapse
CDS-40-60bp
Framework: Phased sanctions relief with nuclear/military inspections. Gradual normalization over 3-6 months.
Precedent: 2015 JCPOA — Iran nuclear deal led to $10-15 oil decline over 6 months.
Full Hormuz closure
REALIZED (ongoing)
Oil+$40-60/bbl
Global trade20M bbl/day blocked
BTC+15-20% (flight)
GCC indices-20-30%
Counter-response: US mine-clearing, 5th Fleet escort. Iran has 5,000+ mines, can deploy within hours. Only 2 US MCM ships in theater.
Precedent: 1988 Tanker War — but at far larger scale. Modern mines are harder to sweep. Clearance: weeks to months.

The asymmetric threat

Iran's mine inventory is its most cost-effective deterrent. 5,000+ mines can be deployed in hours; clearing them takes months.

5,000+
Naval mines in inventory
Contact mines (M-08), influence mines, Chinese EM-52 rocket-propelled rising mines, Russian and North Korean advanced types
Hours
Deployment time (IRGC claim)
Fast attack craft, Kilo-class submarines, indigenous Fateh/Ghadir subs, coast-launched rocket systems, aerial delivery
2
US MCM ships in theater
Avenger-class mine countermeasure ships — both in Pacific, not pre-positioned for Hormuz. Coalition allies provide additional MCM assets.
Months
Estimated clearance time
Modern rising/influence mines far harder to sweep than WWII-era contact mines. 1988 Earnest Will: months of continuous effort for a smaller event.

Data compiled from EIA, BIMCO, Kpler, TeleGeography, CRS, Naval News, Bloomberg, J.P. Morgan, Lloyd's List, Atlas Institute, AGBI, GeoCables, Foreign Policy, and USNI News. Scenario status reflects realized events as of May 29 2026; the original forward probability estimates have been superseded. Those prior estimates were JCJ Investing editorial assessments based on current rhetoric, capability analysis, and historical pattern matching. See the Sources tab in the dashboard for full provenance.

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