Nine straits.
No second route.
The single largest structural vulnerability the platform tracks. Nine maritime chokepoints scored 1–5 — and the three highest-ranked all face Asia with no scalable bypass.
Maritime chokepoint concentration is the single largest structural vulnerability VegaReady tracks. Nine maritime/geoeconomic chokepoints are scored 1–5 on volume, commodity criticality, bypass deficit, military contestability and climate/physical risk. The structural insight is stark: the three highest-ranked — Hormuz (4.4), Taiwan (4.2), Malacca (4.0) — all face Asia and lack scalable bypass, so a single-basin disruption has no near-term substitution path. That is the core case for treating Asia-Pacific energy and semiconductor logistics as a standing tracking vertical. Panama and Cape rank lower on contestability but higher on climate/physical risk — the 2023–24 Panama drought cut FY24 transits 29% before an FY25 recovery.
| Chokepoint | Throughput | Period | Critical commodities | Bypass capacity | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strait of Hormuz | ~20 mb/d oil (~20% global liquids); ~1/5 global LNG | 2024 | Crude (Saudi 38%≈5.5mb/d, Iraq ~22%, UAE ~13%), LNG (Qatar), fertilizer | Very low — Saudi East-West ~7.0 + UAE Habshan-Fujairah ~1.8 = ~8.5–9.0 mb/d nameplate, but only ~5.5–6.5 usable after Yanbu/Fujairah loading limits (vs ~20 baseline) | EIA |
| Strait of Malacca / Singapore | 23.2 mb/d oil (29% global maritime oil); crude 16.6 + products 6.5 | 1H 2025 | Crude, products, container trade to East Asia | Low — Lombok/Sunda add days; no pipeline | EIA via Bernama |
| Bab el-Mandeb / Red Sea / Suez | 4.0 mb/d oil (vs 8.7 in 2023); Suez ~12–15% global trade pre-crisis | Jan–Aug 2024 | Crude, products, containers, ~17% internet traffic | Medium — Cape of Good Hope reroute (+10–14 days) | EIA |
| Panama Canal | ~5% global maritime trade; ~2.3 mb/d oil; 13,404 transits FY25 (FY24 trough 9,936, −29%) | FY2025 | Containers (US–Asia), LPG/LNG, grain, dry bulk | Medium — Suez/Cape or US land bridge | IMF; gCaptain |
| Turkish Straits (Bosphorus-Dardanelles) | ~3 mb/d oil (Russian/Caspian crude) | recent | Crude, grain (Black Sea corridor), products | Low — no alternate sea route from Black Sea | Statista |
| Danish Straits / Baltic | Russian seaborne crude exit; 54% via shadow tankers | April 2026 | Russian crude/products | Low — Baltic has no alternate exit | CREA |
| Cape of Good Hope | 9.2 mb/d oil (vs 6.0 in 2023); record 24M dwt tanker traffic wk of Apr 13 | 2024–2026 | Crude/products/containers diverted from Suez | N/A — itself the bypass route | EIA; BI Africa |
| Strait of Gibraltar | ~100,000 vessels/yr; >10% global maritime trade | 2024 | Mediterranean–Atlantic containers, crude, LNG | High — open ocean approaches | SAM Algeciras |
| Taiwan Strait | >20% global maritime trade; $2.45tn goods | 2022 | Semiconductors, containers, energy to NE Asia | Low — Luzon Strait detour limited | CSIS ChinaPower |
Volumes are oil-transit unless noted; "bypass" measures the existence of a scalable alternative route or pipeline. Only the Cape of Good Hope record-tanker figure (24M dwt/wk) is PROVISIONAL-2026; its 9.2 mb/d diverted-oil flow is a clean EIA T1 figure (Jan–Aug 2024).
| # | Chokepoint | Vol | Commodity | Bypass | Mil | Climate | Composite | Beneficiaries of closure | Substitution |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Strait of Hormuz | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 4.4 | US shale/Permian, Atlantic-basin LNG, Saudi/UAE bypass pipelines | 6–36 months (pipelines capped) |
| 2 | Strait of Malacca / Singapore | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 4 | Lombok/Sunda ports, Kra-canal proponents, China overland (BRI) | 12–48 months |
| 3 | Taiwan Strait | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 4.2 | US/Japan/Korea fabs, alternate Asian ports, defense primes | 24–60 months (semis) |
| 4 | Bab el-Mandeb / Red Sea / Suez | 4 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 3.8 | Cape route operators, longer-haul tanker tonnage, regional ports | weeks (reroute available) |
| 5 | Turkish Straits | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3.4 | Pipeline alternatives (BTC), Mediterranean storage | months |
| 6 | Danish Straits / Baltic | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 3 | Sanctions enforcement, non-Russian crude suppliers | months |
| 7 | Panama Canal | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 2.8 | Suez/Cape routes, US rail land bridge, USGC exporters | weeks–months |
| 8 | Cape of Good Hope | 3 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2.6 | Bunkering hubs (South Africa/Mauritius), tanker owners | n/a (is the bypass) |
| 9 | Strait of Gibraltar | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | Atlantic ports, transshipment hubs (Tanger Med, Algeciras) | days |
Scored 1 (low) to 5 (extreme). Composite scores and ranks are analyst estimates (T3) calibrated to the cited T1/T2 volume anchors; bypass-deficit and military contestability are double-weighted in the rank ordering. The three highest-ranked chokepoints (Hormuz, Taiwan, Malacca) all face Asia and lack scalable bypass — a single-basin disruption has no near-term substitution path.
01 Strait of Hormuz VulnerabilityIndexWorld's most critical oil chokepoint; ~20 mb/d (~20% global liquids), ~1/5 LNG, 84% Asia-bound, minimal bypass. Composite risk 4.4/5, rank #1. high
02 Strait of Malacca / SingaporeIndexLargest oil transit chokepoint by volume: 23.2 mb/d in 1H25 (29% global maritime oil). Composite 4.0/5, rank #2. high
03 Taiwan Strait Trade ExposureIndex>20% of global maritime trade ($2.45tn goods, 2022); semiconductor and NE-Asia energy chokepoint with limited bypass. Composite 4.2/5, rank #3. high
HIGH — EIA chokepoint volumes (Hormuz 20 mb/d 2024, Malacca 23.2 mb/d 1H25); CSIS Taiwan Strait $2.45tn; Panama transit counts (gCaptain/IMF).
MODERATE — Cape of Good Hope diverted-volume and record-tanker figures (PROVISIONAL-2026); Danish Straits shadow-tanker share (CREA).
Quarantined — Composite 1–5 scores and ranks are analyst estimates (T3) calibrated to cited volume anchors — directional, not measured.
Related: The node-level deep dive (Hormuz, Kharg, Ras Tanura, Abqaiq, bypass pipelines, mine warfare) lives on /outlook/infrastructure; the cable dimension on /structural/digital and /markets/defense; oil/LNG flow impact on /markets/energy.